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INSURANCE
Cases involving the Ohio Financial Responsibility Law are beginning
to reach the appellate courts. In Hunsicker v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co.'
while a property damage insurance policy was in effect, allegedly negligent
operation of insured's automobile caused damage to another automobile.
Suit was brought against insured but no service sufficient to give him legal
notice was had and without his knowledge a default judgment ordered. The
policy required the insurer to defend actions against the insured, this duty
being conditioned upon the insurer forwarding to the insured any legal
process which he received. Since no process was served on insured the
court declared the judgment against him void. Further, the court held that
since no service was forwarded to the insurer its duty to defend was not
activated, the condition precedent not having been performed. Conse-
quently, no action for tort liability would lie against the insurer for having
failed to defend the action.
In holding that there was no duty, the court decided that a telephone
notification from the attorney for the owner of the damaged automobile
to the insurer that suit was being brought was not a performance of the
condition in the policy. The court went on to say that, assuming there was
a duty on the insurer to defend, injury resulting from the loss of his driver's
license by insured was not a consequence of the breach of that duty.
The Financial Responsibility Law provides that before a license can be
revoked notice must be given the operator by registered mail and the revo-
cation order shall be revoked if proof is given that a liability policy is
in effect sufficient to cover the damage involved. Here insured was given
verbal notification by the telephone and failed to notify the state that he
had liability insurance. This amounted, in the court's words, to the insured's
having "voluntarily surrendered his license." Consequently, even assum-
ing negligence on the part of the insurer the insured's own acts proximately
caused the loss of the license and any injury resulting therefrom.
In Nellas v. Manufacurers Casualty Ins. Co.2 an insurance solicitor acted
as an independent contractor salesman for an authorized agent of the in-
surer. The salesman accepted an application for liability insurance, notified
the agent to put the insurance into effect and informed the insured that the
insurance was in effect as of that time. It was held that the solicitor was
the agent of the insurer and that insured was entitled to recover for a loss,
which occurred prior to the effective date of the written policy, on the oral
contract of insurance. The court relied on the statute3 which provides
'95 Ohio App. 241, 118 N.E.2d 922 (1953).
' OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4509.01 et seq.
'96 Ohio App. 196, 121 N.E.2d 651 (1953).
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that one soliciting insurance and procuring application shall be held to be
the agent of the company thereafter issuing a policy based on such applica-
tion. This statute although originally concerned with insurance on "build-
ings and structures" was later placed in the general provisions governing
insurance on property and against certain contingencies other than life and
is properly applicable to liability insurance.
In Coletta v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co.4 insured sought to recover for loss on
burglary insurance policy. Insured had suffered a prior loss within the
policy which according to its terms would have reduced the obligation of
the insurer by the amount of that loss. Thereafter, a general agent of the
insurer agreed to have the policy reinstated for its original amount. This
was not done. After a second burglary the insured sought to recover for
loss up to the original amount of the policy. The evidence established that
the general agent had authority to contract on behalf of the insurer sub-
ject to the effect of a provision in the policy that such policy embodied the
entire agreement unless there was alteration by a written endorsement
signed by the insurer's president or secretary. The insurer cannot disable
himself from subsequently contracting orally to modify a written instru-
ment and he cannot so disable himself from acting through an authorized
agent. The general agent was authorized to contract for the insurer and to
elect the procedure for contracting. Consequently, the general agent was
authorized to make an oral contract modifying the existing contract, i.e.
reinstating the original face value of the policy.
In Patten v. Continental Cas. Co. the plaintiff applied for an insurance
policy covering the risk to himself and his family from being afflicted by
poliomyelitis and paid the first premium thereon. One day before the
policy was issued, plaintiff's daughter fell victim to the stated disease. Ad-
mitting no contractual liability on the part of the insurer, plaintiff sought
a tort recovery because of insurer's alleged negligence in acting on the
application. The court, after referring to the uncertain state of the law
throughout the country, held that the trial court was correct in directing a
verdict for defendant on the ground that there was no duty on the insurer
to act on the offer which had been made to it other than to return the premi-
um if the offer was not accepted.
There was a concurring opinion in which dismissal of the action was
also approved but on the ground- that as a matter of law there was a failure
of proof as to plaintiff's obligation to establish defendanes negligence. The
policy was acted on nine days after the application was made. Three of
the nine days consisted of Saturday, Sunday and Labor day on each of which
'OHIO REv. CODE § 3929.27.
196 Ohio App. 70, 121 NXE.2d 148 (1953).
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days defendant's home office was closed. There was also a dissenting
opinion stating that the petition did state a cause of action and that the evi-
dence raised a jury question as to negligence.
In Royal Sausage & Meat Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.6 recovery
was sought on a "water damage" policy which excluded recovery for loss
caused by explosion. Plaintiff operated a sausage stuffing machine under
compressed air pressure. While in operation the pressure caused the top
of the machine to break and fly into the air. One piece of the lid struck
and punctured a water pipe resulting in a discharge of water which caused'
damage. The court held that "an explosion is a rapid, sudden and violent
expansion of air or relinquishment of energy causing a rupture" and that
although usually caused by fire could be caused by other energy factors such
as the air pressure in the present case. Hence, the injury was caused by
an explosion and coverage for the injury was excluded from the policy.
In Burks v. Louisille Title Ins. Co.7 suit was brought on a title insur-
ance policy when, after claim by a neighboring landowner, the insured
employed a surveyor who ascertained that a portion of the land insured
was not within the premises described and purchased by the insured. The
title company claimed the suit was premature since the disputed boundary
had not been judicially determined and therefore no loss had been estab-
lished. However, the court held that there was no provision in the con-
tract of insurance requiring the plaintiff to institute an action to clear up.
adverse claims of title before proceeding against the insurer. The existence
of the claimed defect is a fact to be proved which when established, fur-
nishes the predicate for the recovery of damages for breach of contract.
In Griffin v. General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Co." deceased took out in-
surance, the policy for which gave his name and address in the proper
place. The policy, in the space provided for his occupation, also listed the
address of his place of employment. The policy provided that it could be
cancelled by "mailing to the named insured at the address shown in this
policy written notice .... The mailing of notice as aforesaid shall be suf-
ficient proof of notice ..... Notice of cancellation was mailed to the
address which insured had given in the policy and was subsequently re-
turned to sender with the notation "not at." Upon insured's death, suit
was brought on the policy and the insurer defended on the ground that the
policy had been cancelled. The court held the purported cancellation was
ineffective.
In this case insurer knew that the notice had not been received; knew
the business address of the insured, where in fact he could have been
'162 Ohio St. 18, 120 N.E.2d 441 (1954).
'117 N.E.2d 207 (Ohio App. 1954).
695 Ohio App. 509, 121 N.E.2d 94 (1953).
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reached; and, through the knowledge of their agent, knew where the in-
sured could be reached.
In the absence of evidence that reasonably diligent efforts were made
to find the insured and deliver such notice, mere proof of the depositing
of the notice in the mail addressed to the insured at the address stated in
the policy is suffident, but not conclusive, proof of notice, and may be
overcome by evidence that such notice was not actually received by the in-
sured and is ineffective to support a finding as a matter of law that the
policy was duly cancelled.
The cases dealing with this problem show some variations in holding
due to difference of policy language. Also, nation wide, there is lack of uni-
formity in decision even on similar language. However, the present case
is in accord with the more usual holding that mere mailing of the notice
will not effect a cancellation of the policy when the insurer could -have
actually communicated with the policy holder by the exercise of "reasonably
diligent" efforts.
The apparently ever-present question of the scope of the term "insured"
within an automobile liability policy, where use by a permittee of the named
insured is included, was again before the courts of Ohio. In Folden v,.
Wolp the general principle is recognized that the mere fact of use by a
permittee of an automobile owned by the named insured was the proper
basis for a reasonable inference that such operation was by permission of
the named insured. However, in that case the court found that such infer-
ence was refuted by the explanatory evidence presented.
In Hoosier Condensed Milk Co. v. Doner'0 plaintiff had suffered an
accident for which defendant was allegedly responsible. Plaintiff carried
$100 deductible automobile insurance on the damaged vehicle. Insurer
paid plaintiff the amount of the loss minus the $100 deduction and took
what purported to be an assignment of all of plaintiffs rights against the
parties responsible. Plaintiff then sued defendant for the injury and de-
fendant moved for judgment on the ground that plaintiff was not the
real party in interest. The trial court granted the motion, but the appellate
court reversed holding that the assignment in the subrogation receipt was
to be read in the light of the obligation of the insurer to the plaintiff. Since
insurer's obligation did not cover the first one hundred dollars the plaintiff
retained his interest in that portion of the claim. He was, therefore, a real
party in interest.
Rademaker v. Atlas Assur. Co. Limited" considered the effect of sub-
mission to appraisers of sound value of a building and value of loss and
damage following a fire.. The submission was as provided in the insurance
'94 Ohio App. 403, 116 N.E.2d 41 (1953).
119 NE.2d 90 (Ohio App. 1951).
a96 Ohio App. 84, 121 NE.2d 100 (1951).
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